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Abstract.  We present a prototype system that can be used to capture 
longitudinal socialising processes by recording people’s encounters in 
space.  We argue that such a system can usefully be deployed in prisons 
and other detention facilities in order help intelligence analysts assess 
the behaviour or terrorist and organised crime groups, and their 
potential relationships.  Here we present the results of a longitudinal 
study, carried out with civilians, which demonstrates the capabilities of 
our system.
1. Introduction
In this paper we argue that the deployment of pervasive technology in 
detention facilities can provide intelligence in relation to the activities of 
terrorist and organised crime groups, as well as their emerging relationships. 
Evidence suggests that detention facilities are increasingly becoming fora 
where terrorists and organised criminals establish channels of communication 
and co-operation, and more importantly recruit new members.  Here we argue 
that the systematic capturing and analysis of the social processes within 
detention facilities can enhance intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ 
understanding of the groups’ operation and behaviour.
To demonstrate the type of data that can be obtained from detention facilities, 
we present the results of a longitudinal study we carried out in the City of 
Bath, UK, involving civilians who socialised in various locations across the 
city.  Here we discuss how we were able to automatically capture and analyse 
data on people’s encounters, and we present the results of our analysis.  While 
our study did not take place in an actual detention facility, nevertheless it did 
take place in a real world setting and, as such, provides useful insights into 
how pervasive technologies may be utilised within detention facilities.  
2. Terrorism and organised crime 
Since the end of the Cold War era, the international community’s public and 
scholarly interest has shifted towards security issues related to the rise of 
transnational criminal and terrorist networks that are perceived to threaten 
national and international security and stability [UN; Shelly 1995].  The 
nature of the threats poised by organised crime and terrorism renders their 
containment by state actors extremely difficult and problematic. Prime 
examples of this difficulty are newly established states in various troublesome 
regions such as the Former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, where states 
have been unsuccessful in managing effectively the activities of criminal 
organisations.  This has permitted local Mafia groups, which claim huge 
profits from illicit markets, to fill political vacuums and develop symbiotic 
relationships with state institutions [Williams, 2000].
Terrorist organisations and groups have been dealt with much more 
proactively.  The measures intended to combat terror activities often require 
exceeding retaliation by means of military intervention and in general 
methods that have been argued undermine human right and civil liberties. 
Examples of these measures include pre-emptive strikes, the establishment of 
Guantanamo Bay detention centre, alleged Rendition flights and increasingly 
draconian legislation in both US and UK.
These emerging security challenges are taking place in a globalised 
environment were distant social systems are becoming increasingly 
interconnected and interdependent. Migration flows from the East to the West, 
and from the South to the North, facilitated by improvements in 
communication and transportation technologies, are contributing to the 
growth of heterogeneous and multiethnic societies. This increased pace of 
physical and electronic interconnection between actors from distant social 
systems has contributed to a rise of weak social ties. According to 
Granovetter’s hypothesis [1973], the establishment of weak ties or bridges 
amongst previously isolated groups,enhance the effectiveness of these actors’ 
organisational structures and thus facilitates the materialisation of their goals. 
Both organised crime and terrorism has been argued to  adhere to the same 
social principles [Chambliss 1971; Cohen 1977;  Lombardo 1994; Williams 
1998,2001; Kleemans & Van de Bund 1999].   
As a result, over time terrorist organisations have developed resilience, and 
have been able to establish intricate channels of communication in order to 
improve and learn from their previous mistakes.  Most significantly, terrorist 
networks are increasingly becoming able to study the operational behaviour of 
security forces, and frequently engage in counter intelligence practices.  At the 
same time, the increased embeddedness of these terrorist networks within 
society makes it easier and more likely to recruit and radicalise through 
propaganda civilians of various social classes and professions. Consequently, 
valuable intelligence that could be fed to ongoing investigations is very likely 
to emerge from unconventional locations and sources, which the security 
apparatuses underestimate or cannot monitor effectively. 
2.1. Prisons as a source of intelligence
The changing structure of the prison population in many European countries 
and the high number of foreign inmates [Council of Europe] increases the 
chances of Islamic militants being imprisoned along with “well-connected” 
criminals and individuals vulnerable to indoctrination methods and 
susceptible to radicalisation.  Moreover, the criminal networks that are 
established in prisons offer significant financial and logistical resources, 
which can facilitate large-scale terrorist attacks [Shelley et al., 2005].  These 
conditions have raised concerns, already expressed by state officials1, with 
regards to the increased possibilities facing detainees in various detention 
facilities.  Sadly, these concerns have been verified through a number of case 
studies. 
For instance, in 2001 Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras was jailed in a Spanish 
prison for drug related offences. Whilst imprisoned, Trashorras established 
regular contact with Jamal Ahmidan who was serving time for a petty crime. 
Both individuals embraced radical Islamic fundamentalist ideas within the 
prison and were recruited in the Takfir wa al-Hijra group, a Moroccan terrorist 
groups linked with al-Qaida [Cuthberson, 2004].  Following their release, 
Ahmidan became the leader of the terrorist cell that conducted the Madrid 
bombing.  In a  drugs-for-bombs exchange with a third party, Trashorras 
provided the cell with explosives  for the 13 backpack bombes that killed 191 
people and injured hundreds. 
Another vivid example of the role of detention facilities as recruitment pools 
of terrorist groups has been the case of the Martyrs of Morocco terrorist cell. 
This group was composed of 18 north African immigrants who were 
radicalised and recruited whilst serving a prison sentence for minor offensives 
including weapon possession, document fraud and robbery [McLean, 2004]. 
According to official sources, the leader of the Martyrs of Morocco cell co-
ordinated an attack to bomb the national high court in Madrid and for that 
pursuit attempted to purchase 500 kilograms of explosive materials,2  but was 
detained before carrying out the attack.  It is worth noting that the Martyrs of 
Morocco cell was connected through prisons with the spiritual leader (emir) 
1 Testimony of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI Before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 
Security October 14, 2003: "Terrorist  Recruitment in Prisons and The Recent Arrests Related 
to  Guantanamo Bay Detainees". See http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/
pistole101403.htm
2  Madrid ABC: Spanish Judge Orders Remanding of Islamists Involved in Bomb Plot (24-
Oct-2004)
of the Madrid bombing and with members of the ETA terrorist group [Bar et 
al., 2005; Haahr-Escolano, 2004]. 
3. Pervasive technology for detention facilities
As part of our research, we prototyped a pervasive system that captures 
longitudinal socialising processes by recording and analysing people’s 
encounters in space.  To achieve this, we utilised Bluetooth technology, 
typically found in mobile devices.  Bluetooth technology has a characteristic 
that renders it appropriate for studying people’s encounters. In contrast to the 
wireless signals emitted by typically static WiFi access points, the signals 
emitted by Bluetooth devices map very closely to the movements of people 
around the city, which in turn are a unique indicator of encounter and 
socialising.  In previous work, we found that approximately 7.5% of observed 
pedestrians had discoverable Bluetooth devices [O’Neill et al., 2006].  This 
number most certainly varies between different cities, but still it shows that a 
considerable portion of the public was recorded using our method.
Our basic setup, replicated across 4 sites, involved installing a computer that 
constantly recorded the presence of nearby Bluetooth devices within a 10-
meter range (Figure 1).  This data enables us to correlate pedestrian 
movements with Bluetooth device movements, providing baseline data about 
the penetration of Bluetooth into city life.  On the right side of Figure 1 we 
see that for each unique device (i.e. person), we are able to capture sessions, 
defined as the points in time when each person was in close range of the 
scanner (indicated as yellow horizontal bars).  Subsequently, we are able to 
detect encounters (indicated as links between the sessions), which we define 
as overlapping sessions.  In other words, an encounter takes place when two 
people are in the same place at the same time.
In our study we considered four locations, which we shall refer to as 
• campus
• street
• pub 
• office
The first two locations are outdoor pedestrian streets, one on our campus and 
one in the city of Bath, both of which connect open spaces and can be thought 
of as pedestrian gateways.  The latter two are indoor locations where visitors 
typically spend some time in them.  The pub is open to anyone over the age of 
18, while the office is a secure location where only employees and their 
visitors have access.
We should point out that the nature of Bluetooth technology mitigates against 
extreme accuracy of location.  The 10-meter range of our Bluetooth scanner 
reached beyond walls, and in adjacent offices.  Effectively, if our scanner 
picked up a Bluetooth device, there is no way of knowing if that device was 
on the street, or in any of the offices.  Despite this, on aggregate level we still 
get quite distinctive patterns of data between the first two and last two 
locations, as we describe in the next sections.  This is because the great 
majority of devices our scanners picked up was indeed on the street (for the 
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Figure 1. Left:  At each scanning location, our computer uses Bluetooth to monitor the presence 
of mobile devices within an approximate 10 meter radius. Right: Each recorded device is 
allocated its own timeline (dotted horizontal lines).  Using data from our scanners, we can plot 
each device’s visit  sessions (yellow bars).  Overlapping sessions are identified and linked (solid 
lines), thus indicating encounters.
first two locations).   During a six month study of our prototype, we captured 
approximately 10,000 unique devices.  In the following sections we describe 
in detail the data we captured and the analyses we carried out.
4. Data & Analysis
The method we used to scan for Bluetooth devices generates discrete data 
about the presence of devices in the environment.  A visualisation of our raw 
data, which we have termed timeline, can be seen in Figure 2.  Here, each dot 
represents a discovery event, i.e. a point in time (x-axis) when our Bluetooth 
scanner picked up a specific device in the environment.  By applying filters, 
we can see that, for example, device 16 was present in the environment 
between approximately 18.5 minutes and 19.5 minutes.
To study the patterns of co-presence in our data, we first need to identify 
instances where two or more devices were present at the same place and the 
same time.  For example, in Figure 2 we see that devices 12 and 13 
encountered each other. We developed filters that analysed our data and gave 
us instances of devices encountering each other at each of the four locations in 
our study.  These initial results took the form of records: <device1_id, 
device2_id, location>
Figure 2: A timeline visualisation of our Bluetooth gatecounts.  Each device is given  its own 
timeline (dashed lines) and each discovery event is plotted as a circle on the timeline.
At this stage in our analysis we had a long list of such records, describing 
which devices encountered each other and in which location.  For example, in 
Figure 1 we see that devices 12 and 13 encountered each other at 15.5 minutes 
and were together for approximately 1 minute.  This list of encounters is a 
textual representation of the patterns of encounter across our four locations. 
To further study the patterns and structure hidden within this list, we 
transformed it to four social network graphs, one for each location.  Assuming 
that each device from our dataset becomes a node in the social graph, then the 
list of encounters indicates which nodes are connected.  Proceeding in this 
manner, we generated four social network graphs, one for each location.  
For illustration purposes, in Figure 3 we show the graph from the pub location 
in our study.  In this graph, each device is represented as a node in the graph, 
and connected nodes indicate that these devices encountered each other at 
some point.  We see that most devices are linked to the main core, whilst some 
devices are islands.  The latter indicates cases where a device was seen only 
Figure 3: A graph visualisation of the encounters that  we recorded at one of the locations in our 
study. 
by itself and never in the presence of others.  Additionally, the size of nodes 
represents the total amount of time that a device has spend in this location, 
while the colour of the nodes (blue to red) indicates the betweenness of a node 
(from 0 to 1 respectively).
One of our initial observations was that due to the sheer number of nodes in 
the graphs, the visualisations themselves helped little in analysing our data, 
due to visual clutter.  However, by transforming our data into graph form, we 
were able to run a number of well-established analysis algorithms using 
existing software (e.g. Pajek, Ucinet).  Specifically, we analysed each of our 
four graphs in terms of
• Degree centrality, calculated as the number of neighbours of each node.
• Closeness centrality (access), calculated for any given node as the 
number of nodes (minus 1) divided by the sum of all distances between 
the node and every other node.
• Betweenness centrality (control), calculated for any given node as the 
proportion of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes that include this 
node.
• Distance, calculated as the probability that the shortest path between a 
random pair of nodes will be 1, 2, 3, etc.
The degree and closeness centrality are measures of the reachability of a node 
within a network, and describe how easily information can reach a node. 
Betweenness centrality indicates the importance of a node, and the extent to 
which it is needed as a link in the chains of contacts that facilitate the spread 
of information within the network. Effectively, the centrality measures we 
focused on can indicate each individual’s role, or potential, within the 
observed social structure.
5. Results: capturing social processes
To gain an overview of the structural properties of the graphs representing 
encounter, we calculated the metrics shown in Table 1.  For each of our 
locations we calculated the number of unique devices that were recorded by 
our Bluetooth scanner, the size of the largest core in the encounter graphs, the 
number of edges in the largest core, the density of the largest core as well as 
the size of the 2nd largest core.  We also calculated some generic centrality 
measures for each of the largest cores: network degree, closeness and 
betweenness centralisation.  Finally, we measured the maximum and average 
degree of each graphs, the longest shortest-path distance in each of the graphs, 
as well as the average shortest-path distance.
In addition to the above metrics, for each of degree, closeness and 
betweenness centrality measures we generated ranked log-log plots.  To do 
this we attached a value (either degree, closeness or betweenness) to each 
node in the graphs (only the core), and then sorted this list in descending 
order.  We then plotted the sorted lists, resulting in three sets of graphs 
(degree, closeness, betweenness) for each of our four gates.  Additionally, we 
Campus Street Pub Office
Unique devices 1162 8450 4175 329
Largest core 1028 2738 4036 318
2nd largest core size 2 4 2 1
Edges in largest core 6434 5060 23919 2419
Density 0.5% 0.007% 1.4% 2.2%
Network Degree Centralisation 0.43 0.51 0.68 0.73
Network Closeness Centralisation 0.49 0.55 0.66 0.65
Network Betweenness Centralisation 0.36 0.65 0.57 0.27
Max degree 454 1394 2758 246
Average degree 12.26 3.70 11.85 15.21
Max distance (diameter) 6 10 9 4
Average distance 2.72 2.96 2.44 2.04
Average clustering coefficient 0.50 0.32 0.68 0.82
Table 1: Metrics for each of our four graphs.
generated a fourth set of graphs, based on the probable distance between any 
randomly selected pair of nodes.  These graphs are shown in Figures 4 to 7.
5.1. Structural measures
Our results indicate that the data captured by our prototype is far from 
random.  On the contrary, across the four locations of our study we identified 
homogeneous patterns and comparable underlying temporal behaviour.   To 
demonstrate this, here we focus our discussion on the various properties of the 
social graphs that we listed in Table 1.  The way we captured and analysed our 
data prohibits us from directly inferring intelligence for each of the social 
networks.  However, by comparing the properties the social graphs across our 
four locations we can begin to draw a picture of the communities that inhabit 
those locations.  Also, it is important to keep in mind that in our observations 
of the four locations the only parameter we changed was the location itself: 
the hardware, software and algorithms we used to derive our results are 
identical for all locations.  Although it can be argued that our data are affected 
by a number of further variables, we consider those as part of the location and 
the environment.
A notable feature of the graphs is their size.  As we expected, the city street 
had the most “visitors”, followed by the pub, the campus and the office.  This 
is quite representative of the populations inhibiting each of the locations, since 
the street is open to everyone, thus likely to get lots of distinct visitors.  The 
pub is also open to everyone (over 18) and again has a large population of 
potential visitors.  The campus, on the other hand, is mostly visited by 
students and staff, which amount to about 15,000 students and staff (while the 
population of Bath is about 86,000).  Finally, the office is a secure area where 
only employees have access, thus a small population of potential visitors.
It is interesting to note, however, that the social network of the street consists 
of about 2/3 islands, with the core consisting of about 1/3 of the devices. 
Looking at Table 1 we see that the campus has a much higher density than the 
street. This indicates that there are more static devices on the campus, such as 
computers or employees phones, which are likely to act as hubs which 
connect to the core those single devices that go past in the environment.  This 
is something we can verify from Figure 4, where we see the street graph has a 
few well connected hubs but then falls quite sharply, as opposed to the 
campus where there are many more nodes with degree between 100 and 5.
It is interesting to note that both locations where the public can go, the street 
and the pub, have quite large max-degree (1394 and 2758), yet average degree 
is much smaller on the street than the pub (3.70 and 11.85).  In fact, in Figure 
4 we see that the pub completely outperforms the street in terms of degree. 
This is due to the fact that most people in the pub are co-present, thus they get 
linked together.  In other words, a visit in the pub can give someone much 
more opportunity for copresence than a visit in the street.  This is something 
we expect, as it is the primary purpose of a pub.  Also, we should note that in 
the pub there are certain devices with extremely high degrees, which we 
believe are attributed to members of staff or regular customers.  These act as 
central hubs that bring together all the customers of the pub into the central 
core of the social graph.  The same is true in the office, where a number of 
devices have a relatively high degree, indicating that these people come in 
frequent contact with others.
5.2. Network centrality measures
In general, across the four locations the “tightness”  of the communities varies. 
Specifically, the office and the pub have shorter average distances between 
their members (2.04 and 2.44 in Table 1 respectively), and we also see in 
Figure 7 that the probability curves of these two locations are shifted to the 
left.  This is further enhanced by the relatively high density of the pub and the 
office, which indicates more interactions between the members of the 
community.
Another interesting point to note is that although the pub has quite a tight and 
dense population, it has large diameter (9), which is also true of the street 
(10).  Yet, the pub has a smaller average distance (2.44) as opposed to the 
street (2.96).  Coupled with the density measures, we can describe the pub’s 
network as a large central core, while the street’s network more closely 
resembles a small core with a number of branches and additionally a large 
number of islands. 
Considering the network centralisation measures we can make more 
inferences about the overall structure of the social networks.  These measures 
range from 0 to 1 and indicate a similarity to a perfect linear-shaped network 
(0) or to a perfect star-shaped network (1). This is calculated for each of 
degree (DC), closeness (CC) and betweenness (BC).  The office scores high 
on DC and CC indicating that some nodes can be reached more easily than 
others, yet BC is low, indicating that all nodes are more or less equally 
important in terms control and communication.   The opposite is true of the 
pub, where high DC and CC are coupled with high BC.  This indicates that 
there are certain nodes in the pub that act as hubs of communication and 
control (most likely the members of staff or regular customers).  Comparing 
the campus and street in terms of centralisation measures also yields 
interesting insights. Both have similar levels of DC and CC, but the campus 
has low BC while the street has high BC.  This indicates that on the street 
there are a few important nodes, while on campus the nodes are more equal. 
5.3. Cumulative distribution measures
We now consider the graphs shown in Figures 4 to 7, which we found much 
more useful than a visualisation of the social networks themselves.  A really 
interesting observation is that although in each of the 4 graphs the lines have 
similar shape, the subtle differences are crucial pointers as to the effect of 
space on encounter.  For instance, the variation in how sharply the values fall 
is a useful indicators, along with the overall steepness of the graphs.
Figure 4: Ranked log-log plots of degree for each of our four locations.
Figure 5: Ranked log-log plots of closeness for each of our four locations.
Figure 6: Ranked log-log plots of betweenness for each of our four locations.
Figure 7: Probability plots of shortest path distance for each of our four locations.
When considering the whole range of values, degree graphs are overall more 
close to a power law distribution.  Closeness graphs have short sharp tails, 
with a body that approximates a power law extremely well.  Similarly, 
betweenness graphs have long sharp tails, while their body approximates a 
power law.  The distance probability graphs can be approximated by a Poisson 
distribution. 
The graphs we derived from analysing our Bluetooth data point to power-law 
distributions (γ≈0.6-1.1 for degree, γ≈1.2-1.4 for betweenness, γ≈0.1 for 
closeness) that are characteristic of scale-free, or self-similar networks.  Such 
networks imply infinite variance, and usually in such networks there are a few 
nodes with extremely large number of links.  Barabási et al. (1999a) have 
dubbed such networks ‘scale-free’, by analogy with fractals, phase transitions 
and other situations where power laws arise and no single characteristic scale 
can be defined. These characteristics can be found in kinship networks, 
physical and biological systems, and economic systems.
Scale-free networks have stimulated a great deal of theorising. The earliest 
work is due to [Simon, 1955], independently rediscovered by Barabási et al. 
[1999a; 1999b]. They show that scale-free networks emerge automatically 
from a stochastic growth model in which new nodes are added continuously 
and attach themselves preferentially to existing nodes, with probability 
proportional to the degree of the target node. Effectively, the richly connected 
nodes get richer.
We believe that our scanners recorded a phenomenon and process which is 
quite similar to the “rich getting richer”  model, which explains the presence of 
power laws in our data.  In terms of encounters, those people who have more 
links and encounters are the ones who are present more in the environment. 
When a new person comes along, chances are that they are going to encounter 
the regular customers or the employees.  Thus, they share an encounter with 
an already well-connected person in the graph.  It is this exact process that has 
been shown to result in power-law distributions.  
6. Suitability for detention facilities
Our analysis suggests that intricate social processes were captured by our 
prototype, given adequate time and a large enough sample of people to be 
observed.  Additionally, the underlying properties of our data suggest that our 
prototype did not capture noise, but somewhat of a “slice of reality”. 
Interpreting the numbers generated by our algorithms can yield insight, but 
doing so requires knowledge of the scanning locations and the people being 
observed in them.
Similarly, analysing data captured by our system in a detention facility 
requires knowledge of the exact locations where the system was installed, as 
well as knowledge of the underlying behaviour of people in those areas. 
Analysts with such knowledge can draw on they automated data collection 
capability of our system to augment their ongoing efforts in understanding the 
links between various terrorists and organised crime organisations.  There are, 
however, a number of issues that need to be resolved before utilising such a 
system for intelligence gathering in a detention facility.
To begin with, Bluetooth is only one possible technology that may be used for 
our purposes.  Other proximity technologies such as RFID, NFC, and possibly 
ZigBee are all potential candidates for such a system.  In fact, RFID would be 
the preferred mechanism, as RFID tags can easily be embedded in clothes or 
any other items that detainees may carry / be forced to carry. Key to the 
success of this scheme is the ability to relate each detainee to an individual or 
a set of RFID/Bluetooth identifiers.  Ideally, these identifiers would persist  for 
each individual across detention facilities. 
An obvious issue with intentionally tagging individuals in a detention facility 
has to do with human rights abuse.  While as technology developers we are 
merely highlighting the technological possibilities, we do wish to point out 
that our tagging system simply augments already established mechanisms of 
detention facilities, such as CCTV and human observation.  Our system 
simply makes the identification of an individual detainee much quicker and 
more efficient, when compared to the analysis of days’ worth of CCTV 
footage.
In addition to establishing the technological components required to deploy 
our system, an appropriate infrastructure is necessary so that data generated 
by our system can be readily accessed and analysed by intelligence agencies. 
This is most efficiently achieved by establishing a centralised data server, 
which will be used to store data arriving from various detention facilities. 
Subsequently intelligence agencies can issue queries to the data server, and 
retrieve the necessary information.
While in this paper we have presented a palette of tools and methods for 
analysing our systems data, further tools will be required in order to meet 
intelligence agencies’ requirements.  Ideally, our system will be used to 
augment ongoing investigations, by providing analysts with information that 
can be evaluated on a per-case basis.  For instance, our system’s central server 
could provide information about two people’s relationship during their stay at 
a detention facility.  Additionally, our system can provide an assessment of a 
suspect’s social network, and people they are likely to contact once they are 
released from the detention facility.  Effectively, analysts can look for 
patterns, or deviation from patterns in the data captured by our system, and 
evaluate these on an ad-hoc basis.
7. Conclusion and ongoing work
In this paper we describe our attempts to measure and quantify longitudinal 
socialising processes in a detention facility. We present a study where four 
distinct civilian locations were chosen for installing Bluetooth scanners which 
monitor the presence, and thus encounter, of people in those spaces.  Our 
scanners generated a very rich data set that we used to derive social graphs for 
each of the four locations.
In our analysis we focused on the derived social graphs, and were able to 
compare various well-established properties and measurements of social 
graphs across the four locations.  We found that the graphs exhibit power-law 
distributions when plotting their properties in rank-ordered graphs.  These are 
characteristic of scale-free networks that can be found in kinship networks, 
physical and biological systems, and economic systems.
Our findings suggest that the utilisation of our system for capturing the 
socialising processes within detention facilities is a quire realistic strategy. 
This will require a number of issues to first be clarified, including the 
technological and infrastructure  details, as well as the ethical and human 
rights challenges intrinsic to tracking and monitoring inmates.
As part of our ongoing work we are interested in exploring further our data 
sets.  For example, we are interested in experimenting with different rules for 
generating the social graphs from the Bluetooth data.  Also, we are in the 
process of running emulations of our data to explore ways in which 
information is diffused and spreads across the social networks.
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